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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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ward this demand to Poland, Moscow had simultaneously declared in its
Press that it c did not desire to interfere in the internal affairs of neigh-
bouring countries.' After the secret agreement reached in Teheran, it
was not difficult for the Soviets to assume that London and Washington.,
although offering mediation in the Polish affair, would not be too obstinate
over satisfying Moscow's demand at Poland's cost. The Kremlin con-
sidered its position to be now so strong that it could reject the friendly
offer., gratified with the impression which such a step would have on
world opinion. By asking the British and U.S. to intervene in their
negotiations with Russia,, and by mentioning this fact (with the consent
of the two Powers) in their reply to Moscow, the Poles were aware that
the fate of Poland hung on the ability of the Big Three to conclude some
pact to stabilise the system of European security.
The Russian refusal to discuss the problem with Poland or with the
Anglo-Saxon Powers violated the Moscow Agreement of October. The
Soviets turned down this opportunity of seeking an international solution
to the Polish affair, preferring to adhere to the one-sided decision of
dictatorship which, at its best, meant for Poland (that is, partitioned Poland)
the role of a satellite, a la Czecho-Slovakia in the Hitler regime.
Despite the Soviet's answer, which clearly spumed the good ofSces of
London and Washington, London refused to give up and tried yet once
again. Moscow must be convinced, even if it meant pleading with her.
Already, therefore, at this early stage London was obliged to make some
promising suggestion to Moscow regarding this problem. Stalin, in
reply to Churchill's letter, reiterated his demands and, according to the
comments of the Soviet Press, even hardened his attitude regarding these
" Polish proposals which postponed every real decision and offered none
of the immediate guarantees which Moscow seeks as a preliminary to a
settlement." Stalin again emphatically insisted that the Poles :
(T) must immediately recognise the c Curzon Line 3 as the basis for
frontier discussion with the possibility of some modifications, but
with the firm indication that Lwow should remain with Russia.
(Moscow, some time before, had hinted that perhaps Lwow might be
left to Poland; Stalin had agreed to this in any case, during his talks
with General Sikorski). Poland was to receive (now it was more
clearly defined than in the Soviet Declaration of January n), the
western and southern parts of East Prussia (leaving Koenigsberg* and
its neighbourhood for the Russians), and other territories which she
had claimed in the west, the remainder of Upper Silesia and parts of
German Pomerania.
(2) An immediate call by the Polish Government on the Under-
ground for full co-operation with the Red Army. Stalin was ques-
* Koenigsberg is a unique and valuable pore of East Prussia, and in Russian
hands meant that the full control of the Danzig gulf and the Polish Baltic sea coast
would be in their power.